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U co-legislators are having a hard time agreeing on regulation for alternative 
investment funds (AIFs). Following-up the G-20 commitments, the 
Commission’s proposal – published in April last year – did not manage to 
convince Member States and Parliament. After long negotiations – chaired by two 
different presidencies – the compromise issued by the Council late in August signals a 
consensus on a number of topics, such as the valuation and depositary functions. 
However, two important and complex topics – third country equivalence and private 
equity rules – are still under negotiation.  
Suspense will reign until the very end. Not only is the future of alternative investments 
at stake, but also the whole asset management industry in Europe. In the end, the 
Commission may need to prepare a small revision of UCITS IV (the fourth iteration of 
legislation governing Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities) 
based on the final outcome of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive 
(AIFMD) negotiations. The reason for this regulatory action is to ensure financial 
stability and greater transparency in areas that have so far mostly gone unregulated. But 
also in the background, a widening pension gap and the need to generate enough returns 
to meet long-term liabilities worry policy-makers, industry and ultimately families. 
Setting the scene 
In a nutshell, the AIFM Directive will shed new light on the more opaque areas of asset 
management, such as hedge funds and private equity funds. In effect, it brings about a 
single passport regime for managers of funds not covered by the UCITS Directive. 
Major categories of non-UCITS funds include: 
•  Hedge funds 
•  Private equity funds (buy-out funds, venture capital funds, etc.) 
•  Commodity funds 
•  Real estate funds 
•  Infrastructure funds 
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It gives sufficient leeway to managers to market these funds to professional investors in 
all countries of the EU, within the meaning of the MiFID (Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive). As a result, more in theory than in practice, the choice of 
investors in the EU should be expanded and the asset management industry should be 
able to fully reap the benefits of the single market. However, both the manager and the 
fund need to be domiciled in the EU, while the market for alternative investments is 
essentially global. Funds and managers domiciled abroad will be subject to different 
provisions that have yet to be determined. To this legal uncertainty, the Dodd-Frank bill 
in the US Congress
1 and its limitations on proprietary trading and investments by banks 
in hedge funds and private equity have added further economic uncertainty. In effect, 
Europe thus may be tempted to pursue a similar crackdown on alternative investments, 
which aims at curbing the flow of liquidity coming from financial institutions into these 
funds instead of limiting the use of non-EU funds or propping up their financial 
structure, as currently is under discussion in Europe. These opposite approaches are 
producing legal and economic uncertainty due to the global nature of this market and 
raising questions on how to generate returns in a regulatory environment struggling to 
reduce systemic risk and financial instability at any cost. 
Latest developments: The critical points of the Directive 
Despite recent divergences, the latest compromise – published by the Council late this 
August – seems to have reached consensus on a number of issues. See the table in the 
annex for a comparison of the Commission’s proposal with the compromise proposals 
of March and August 2010. 
First, the original regime for authorisations included the provision requiring the 
Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) to draft a list of ‘possible 
investment strategies’ and Member States to decide which among them fund managers 
could pursue. The discretionary aspects of this provision seemed quite unfortunate, and 
the Council decided to drop this regime. By all means, coming up with a comprehensive 
list of strategies is a difficult exercise that may create loopholes and spaces for 
circumvention. Furthermore, partial authorisations would have put the industry in a 
straight-jacket, reducing incentives to invest in alternative funds. The latest draft instead 
finds a more balanced equilibrium foreseeing a simple authorisation to cover all types of 
portfolio and risk management outside the UCITS regime.  
The main objective of the earlier provision – i.e. preserving financial stability – will still 
be secured since supervisors are given powers to impose restrictions for leveraged AIFs 
in the event of a menace to macro-stability. Such restrictions include, most prominently, 
limits on leverage and additional reporting requirements. Hence, no compulsory limits 
on leverage are set that would affect the whole industry under normal market 
conditions. There had been proposals to do so from some Member States and MEPs, but 
evidence suggests that leverage is not currently a problem of the industry as a whole. 
For instance, hedge funds operate with much lower leverage than banks (see Figure 1). 
Funds operating with leverage on a ‘systematic basis’ (to be defined) will face these 
additional reporting obligations. Furthermore, funds will have to give investors 
information about how they use leverage and the extent of its use. Altogether, the 
system has clear rationales:  
1)  investment strategies and innovation should in principle not be constrained;  
                                                 
1 H.R. 4173, Title IV, Sec. 401-416. 3 
2)  authorities will receive the reporting that matters for systemic stability separately; 
and  
3)  investors are not relieved of their responsibility to evaluate the risks they undertake, 
but are instead given more information to do so. 
Figure 1. Banks’ versus hedge funds’ leverage (Q2 2008) 
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Note: The left axis illustrates, for banks, the balance sheet leverage multiple 
(total assets divided by total equity) of individual banks weighted by asset 
size; for hedge funds, total assets divided by capital. 
Sources: IMF (2008), p. 41; and World Bank (2009), p. 5. 
 
Second, another unfortunate provision no longer exists. Member states were given 
discretion to decide which part of the Directive they wanted to apply to ’small funds 
managers’, which do not need to be authorised unless they want to enjoy the passport.
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A major risk of this provision was the legal uncertainty due to differences in 
implementation and potential regulatory arbitrages. Apparently, the game is not worth 
the candle for three main reasons: i) ‘small’ funds – even as a whole – are not 
systematically relevant and they only account for 10% or less of assets under 
management;
3 ii) compliance costs may potentially compromise their business model, 
due to their small size; and iii) monitoring them would become impracticable for 
supervisors, as they account for 70% of managers or more.
4 However, small funds will 
need to register and provide simplified reporting so that supervisors get the whole 
picture of the industry. This would certainly increase the transparency of the market, as 
these funds currently operate out of sight.  
                                                 
2 By ‘small funds’, this commentary refers to AIFM under the thresholds of the Directive, that is AIFMs 
whose assets under management do not exceed €100 million (or €500 million if they are not leveraged 
and require a 5-year lock-in to investors). 
3 Approximately 90% of assets but only 30% of hedge funds will fall under the thresholds; as for other 
AIFs, roughly 50% of managers and almost all assets will be captured (see European Commission, 2009, 
p. 48). 
4 Ibid. 4 
Third, independent valuators will not be required in all cases. AIFM may use internal or 
external valuers, as long as the independence of the valuation function is ensured via 
functional and managerial separation. In order to balance this additional flexibility, 
Member States are granted the power to impose audits of internal valuations on a case-
by-case basis. According to a report commissioned by the UK Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) (2010), external valuators are the most costly burden imposed by the 
Directive.  
Fourth, regulators are determined to prevent ‘Madoff-style’ frauds. Safekeeping of 
assets will need to be entrusted to a separate entity and the function will be – in 
principle – incompatible with prime brokerage. Although this is the second-most 
important source of cost according to the FSA study, there have been no concessions. 
Depositaries will face quasi-strict liability and reversed burden of proof, which will 
cause a major structural change in the industry. Depositaries do not only provide 
accounts to deposit financial instruments but also assume risks coming from custodian 
services. The strict liability may push them to be more involved in the formulation of 
investment strategies and in the day-by-day custodian operations of funds. Insiders 
speak of the “custodian who will sit next to you at the trading desk”. Thus, these 
regulatory changes will add to the ongoing boom of the asset servicing industry. Yet, as 
potential risks rise so will costs; and the number of depositaries may go down, raising 
concentration risks.  
Besides, the UCITS regime may need to be updated soon – some call it UCITS V – to 
adapt it to the AIFMD, in particular with regard to the depositary and valuation 
functions. The new provisions may be even more stringent than for AIFs, since UCITS 
are targeted to non-professional investors. 
Table 1. Other areas where consensus has been reached 
Reporting to supervisors. This provision aims at enhancing their capacity to control the build-
up of systemic risk. 
Disclosure to investors. Among others, this regime will benefit small professional investors. 
However, some investors claim that may not require that level of protection, which certainly 
comes at a cost. 
Managers Remuneration. A binding annex on remuneration has been added in order to ensure 
that risk managers are compensated independently from the fund performance. It has been 
criticised because of its level of detail (closer to ‘Level II Lamfalussy’ than to ‘Level I’) and 
because the limits to variable remuneration may induce higher employee turnover. 
 
Finally, there are two areas where consensus has not yet been reached: 
On the one hand, uncertainty surrounds the regime for non-EU funds or non-EU fund 
managers. The initial proposal of the Commission envisaged a passport for foreign fund 
managers subject to stringent requirements in terms of supervision and tax cooperation. 
Member States were in great disagreement on this point, which in the end led the 
passport rules to be dropped altogether. The Council made clear that third country rules 
“should not limit the choice of European investors nor should they be used as a barrier 
to impede the marketing [of non-EU funds] [...] or prevent the EU to comply with WTO 
rules”.
5 The industry complains that foreign funds are being discriminated against for 
                                                 
5 Compromise Proposal of March 2010. Recital 19aa. 5 
their status of non-EU funds with a big cloud around the principle of equivalence, i.e. 
when a non-EU fund or manager should be allowed to market in the EU. The Belgian 
Presidency has listened and brought the passport back to the negotiations, but they 
acknowledge that agreement is not close. This point may be subject to a separate 
discussion. 
On the other hand, a consensus is more likely to be reached for private equity. The 
Compromise Proposal imposes some sort of notification and annual reporting when a 
fund acquires a controlling stake in a non-listed company. The rationale for these 
obligations is unclear, however, given that not only private equity funds hold stakes in a 
non-listed company. In order to ensure a level playing field, it would be better to 
regulate this matter in a horizontal manner; otherwise, problems could arise concerning 
definition and thus the possibility to circumvent the legal obligation with no 
consequence whatsoever. The case of private equity recalls the sequel on short-selling 
that was originally included in the AIFMD and then later separately discussed in a new 
proposal. However, while short-selling will be the subject of ad hoc regulation, an 
important measure for the market for corporate control will be included in a piece of 
regulation that does not necessarily have a direct link with its important allocative 
function. If regulators are trying to solve an issue related to the transparency of these 
latter actions, they should modify the specific regulation dealing with the market for 
corporate control. In effect, the use of an ‘institutional approach’ to regulation (rules for 
specific entities) instead of a ‘functional approach’ (rules for specific services and 
functions performed for the market) increases the complexity of the regulation and the 
risks of circumvention. 
Conclusions 
It is important to note that AIFs play a key role in the economy as sources of long-term 
finance and, increasingly, as investment opportunities for institutional clients, including 
pension funds. Aggressive returns help to build diversified investment portfolios and 
help to meet the liability mismatch of the pension systems, which are burdened by the 
ageing population and other critical issues. Regulation needs to increase transparency in 
this area, but this should not affect the way in which these alternative investment funds 
deal with risks. By definition, these funds are designed to deal with risky assets and they 
should be allowed to continue to do so. 
The AIFMD is an important piece of legislation whose effects need to be thoroughly 
analysed. A cost-benefit analysis is a difficult exercise but rushing regulation does not 
serve any public interest, as a ‘poor regulatory action’ may be more damaging than ‘no 
action’. Further negotiations and discussions may be needed, to strike the right balance 
between the global nature of this market and the local nature of the investors. Still, it is 
somehow unclear what this Directive wants to achieve. 
The current AIFMD proposal, in the eyes of the regulators, will certainly: 
•  reduce systemic risk and the use of leverage; 
•  increase investor protection and transparency; 
•  enhance market efficiency and integrity; and 
•  benefit the market for corporate control (less hostile takeovers and short sales). 
However, many doubts surround the theoretical framework of asset allocation, and 
therefore some fundamentals of this Directive remain unchallenged. 
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Annex. Comparison of the Commission’s proposal with compromises of March and August 2010 
  Commission Proposal  March 2010 Compromise  August 2010 Compromise 
Scope  -  Refers only to EU AIFM in its scope but in fact regulates also 
non-EU AIFM 
-  EU AIFM 
-  Non-EU AIFM with regard to the marketing of AIF in a MS 
-  EU AIFM (managers of AIF) 
-  Non-EU AIFM if they manage an EU AIF or non-EU AIF to professional investors  
Full exemptions  -  Managers of UCITS  
-  Credit institutions (D2006/48/EC) 
-  Occupational retirement schemes (D2003/41/EC) 
-  Insurers and reinsurers 
-  AIF whose only investor are undertakings and subsidiaries of the 
AIFMD 
-  Authorised managers of occupational retirement schemes (D 
2003/41/EC) 
-  Employee saving/participation schemes 
-  Special purpose entities 
-  AIF whose only investor are undertakings and subsidiaries of the AIFMD 
-  Holding companies 
-  Authorised managers of occupational retirement schemes (D 2003/41/EC) 
-  Employee saving/participation schemes 
-  Special purpose entities 
Small funds 
 
AUM < €100m or  
< €500m if 5 year 
lock-in  
-  Total exemption (no registration and no reporting) 
-  No passport but opt-in possible 
-  MS to decide which parts of the Directive apply to these funds 
-  Compulsory registration and simplified reporting 
-  No passport but opt-in possible 
-  Compulsory registration and simplified reporting 
-  No passport but opt-in possible 
Initial capital  -  No differentiation of internally managed AIF 
-  No possibility to allow for guarantees 
-  Similar provisions to the August Compromise  -  EUR 300m for internally managed AIF 
-  EUR 125m for external AIFM 
-  Additional 0.02% up to EUR 10m 
-  MS may allow 50% in the form of guarantees 
Authorisation  -  Authorisation may be granted for all or certain types of AIF 
(without further reference) 
-  No mention of non-core services 
-  Compatible with UCITS authorisation 
-  MS to decide whether authorisation is granted for all or certain 
types of investment strategies 
-  CESR to produce guidelines to classify investment strategies 
-  No reference was made to MIFID 
-  Compatible with UCITS authorisation 
-  Distinction between externally appointed AIFM and internally managed AIF 
-  No initial limitations as to the investment strategies 
-  MS derogation possible for management of portfolios under investor’s mandate 
-  Non-core services under MiFID  
-  Compatible with UCITS authorisation 
Risk 
management 
-  No requirement to set a maximum level of leverage and right to 
reuse collateral (although disclosure to investors is foreseen) 
-  Similar provisions to the Commission Proposal  -  Functionally separate from portfolio management (under proportionality) 
-  Risk profile / Maximum level of leverage and right to reuse collateral 
-  Risk management system / Stress testing / Due diligence 
-  Liquidity management system 
Short selling  -  Special risk management / Procedures to ensure delivery of 
commitments 
-  Reporting (for systemic stability purposes) 
-  Only reporting obligations  -  In line with the Commission Proposal 
Securitisation -   Requirements for both AIFM and originator 
-  Originator to retain a net economic interest of at least 5% 
-  Similar provisions  -  Similar provisions 
Remuneration 
and conflict of 
interests 
-  No rules about remuneration 
-  Avoid conflict and if not possible disclose 
-  Functional separation of tasks and responsibilities affected by 
conflict 
-  Disclosure of preferential treatment  
-  Similar provisions 
-  Remuneration guidelines 
 
-  Similar provisions 
-  Very detailed binding annex on remuneration (under proportionality) 
 
Delegation 
 
-  No delegation of portfolio management and risk management to 
an entity other than an authorised AIFM 
-  No delegation to depositary, valuer or any other entity affected 
by conflict of interest 
-  No sub-delegation possible 
 
-  No delegation to the depositary  
-  For the rest, similar provisions to the August Compromise 
 
-  Notification requirement 
-  Justification on objective reasons + Not undermine effective supervision 
-  Portfolio and risk management can only be delegated to authorised undertakings 
(subject to cooperation arrangements among supervisors if a third-country 
undertaking) 
-  No delegation to depositary unless conflicts of interest can be managed 
-  Sub-delegation possible under same requirements 
Prime brokers  -  Not mentioned  -  Not mentioned  -  Defined and regulated indirectly 
Valuators 
 
-  External valuer 
-  Incomplete regime, which does not cover liability and other 
aspects 
-  Complex proportionality provision to decide whether external 
valuer is required 
-  Liability regulated in a less clear way 
 
-  Valuer either external or internal but functionally separate (to be notified) 
-  If internal, national authorities may require verification or audit 
-  External valuer liable for negligent or intentional failure but AIFM retains full 
liability towards AIF and investors (no contractual discharge possible) 
-  No delegation possible 8 
-  Incompatible with depositary functions 
Depositaries 
 
-  Only UE credit institutions 
-  No delegation to entities other than EU credit institutions 
-  Quasi-strict liability + reversal of the burden of proof 
-  No detail as to tasks and responsibilities 
 
 
-  Only UE credit institutions or investment firms (exceptions under 
national law only for non-leveraged AIF with 5 year lock-in) 
-  For the rest, similar provisions to the August Compromise but 
definition of tasks and responsibilities less detailed 
 
-  Single external entity (AIFM and prime broker cannot act as depositaries) 
-  UE credit institution, investment firm or other (according to national law) located 
in the home member state of the AIF 
-  For non-EU AIF, it may be a non-EU entity if ESMA deems effective supervision 
exists in the relevant country 
-  Responsible for checking valuation 
-  Quasi-strict liability + reversal of the burden of proof 
-  Delegation (and sub-delegation) possible under strict conditions 
-  Contractual discharge of liability possible with regard to sub-custodians 
-  Reporting upon request to supervisors 
Passport rules 
(EU) 
 
-  Passport granted to EU AIF  with respect to marketing to 
professional investors 
-  Passport granted to EU AIFM with respect to their management 
services 
-  Member States may allow marketing of AIF to retail investors 
and may impose additional requirements for such purpose 
-  Similar provisions 
 
-  Similar provisions 
 
Third country 
rules 
 
-  Passport 
-  Requirement for equivalent regulatory regimes and rigorous tax 
cooperation 
-  Transitional period of three years to allow for the negotiation of 
cooperation arrangements 
-  No passport 
-  Non-EU managers to require authorisation for each MS and 
cooperation agreements among home and host supervisory 
authorities 
-  Cooperation arrangements should not be used as a barrier to 
trade 
-  EU managers able to market non-EU AIF  subject to most 
provisions in the Directive 
 
-  Authorisation may be denied if third country rules impede supervision 
-  Delegation to a third country undertaking requires co-operation between 
supervisors 
-  Depositary for non-EU AIF may be a non-EU entity if ESMA deems effective 
supervision exists in that country 
-  Member States may allow annual reports of non-EU managers to be audited in 
their home country following international auditing standards 
 
PENDING NEGOTIATIONS Passport? (Belgian EU Presidency in favour) 
Private equity -   Applicable to AIFM who acquire 30% or more of voting rights of 
an issuer or no-listed company 
-  Exception for SMEs 
-  Compulsory and fast notification to the company and 
shareholders 
-  Extensive disclosure obligations and annual reporting 
-  Only applicable to AIFM who acquire 30% or more of voting rights 
or no-listed company (not of an issuer) 
-  Exception for SMEs 
-  Extension of the notification delay from 4 trading days to 10 
working days 
-  Suppression of the need to disclose a development plan for the 
non-listed company 
-  Less extended annual reporting 
-  Reporting of leverage supported directly or indirectly by the 
company to supervisors 
PENDING NEGOTIATIONS 
Disclosure to 
investors 
-  Disclosure prior to investment covers a wide variety of 
information (about investment strategy, leverage, risk and 
liquidity management, valuation, conflicts of interest, fees and 
expenses, depositary liability, etc.) 
-  Periodically, the AIFM needs to disclose information about illiquid 
assets and leverage. 
-  Similar provisions  -  Similar provisions 
Reporting to 
supervisors 
-  Disclosure of stress test not required 
-  Disclosure of the extent of re-use of the collateral is not required 
(for any fund) 
-  Main instruments, exposures and concentrations 
-  Special arrangements for illiquid assets 
-  Actual risk profile and management tools 
-  Use of short selling (for systemic stability purposes) 
-  Similar provisions to the August Compromise  -  Main instruments, exposures and concentrations 
-  Special arrangements for illiquid assets 
-  Actual risk profile and management tools 
-  Use of short selling (for systemic stability purposes) 
-  Results of stress tests 
-  If leverage is used on a systematic basis: amount of leverage from borrowing cash 
or securities and embedded in derivatives (and extent of re-use of the collateral) 
Supervisory 
authorities 
-  Home Member State of the AIFM responsible for prudential 
supervision 
-  Host Member State of the AIFM responsible for conduct of 
business 
-  Wide powers of inspection and intervention 
-  Enhanced co-operation 
-  Similar provisions  -  Similar provisions 
-  ESMA is attributed various roles 
-  Wide powers of inspection  
-  Wide powers of intervention (including the repurchase or redemption of units) 
-  Power to impose limits on leverage or other restrictions to limit systemic risk 9 
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